Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
Volume 15

Issue 2

Article 4

6-27-2016

The Challenges of Following Good Advice About Copyright and
the First Amendment
Alfred C. Yen
Boston College Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alfred C. Yen, The Challenges of Following Good Advice About Copyright and the First Amendment, 15
Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 412 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol15/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

4 YEN - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/17/16 9:38 AM

THE CHALLENGES OF FOLLOWING GOOD ADVICE ABOUT
COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ALFRED C. YEN*
Judge McKeown’s perceptive essay describes how the use of
“copyright as censorship”1 threatens free speech in a way that copyright has
not before. Accordingly, Judge McKeown argues that courts should apply
careful First Amendment scrutiny to lawsuits in which the plaintiff sues
under copyright, not to protect the commercial value of a copyright, but to
accomplish censorship. The clear implication is that many of these claims
should fail.2 She exhorts professors, students, and advocates to think
through the implications of her observation.3 I would like to respond to
Judge McKeown by suggesting that her advice can truly influence the
future of copyright only if judges take the advice to heart—even to the
point of discrediting some existing case law.
Copyright as censorship differs from ordinary copyright, not in the
form of the complaint, but in the reasons for bringing a lawsuit. This
distinction gives Judge McKeown’s argument considerable force. Ordinary
copyright plaintiffs sue to protect incentives to create. This connects
directly to the utilitarian purposes for copyright—namely promotion of the
arts—and justifies why protecting the plaintiff’s interests is worth the
potential loss of speech.4 If copyright law prohibits the defendant from
speaking (i.e. creating or disseminating an allegedly infringing work), we
lose the defendant’s speech. However, society gains because we preserve
the economic incentives that spurred the plaintiff’s creation in the first
place. Without these incentives, neither the plaintiff’s original work nor
the defendant’s derivative speech would have existed anyway. Society
* Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Copyright
2016 by Alfred C. Yen.
1. See Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing
Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2015).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 16–17.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass copyright laws “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts”); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 539, 558 (1997) (explaining purpose of copyright is to stimulate creation of new works); Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (explaining purpose of
copyright is to promote the progress of art).
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therefore has some comfort that in these situations, copyright is speech
enhancing.5
By contrast, censoring plaintiffs do not use copyright to protect
copyright incentives. Instead, they sue to protect personal interests that
bear little relation to income streams associated with the exploitation of
copyright rights. For example, censoring plaintiffs sue to silence speech
they consider distasteful,6 to protect privacy,7 or to avoid public ridicule.8
In these situations, censoring the defendant’s speech does little to preserve
the plaintiff’s incentives to create. Enforcing the plaintiff’s copyright claim
therefore does nothing to ensure creation of the plaintiff’s work. Society
loses the defendant’s speech, but it is unlikely that incentives for other
speech offset this loss. Accordingly, it makes sense to worry that copyright
as censorship reduces speech.
If we accept the proposition that courts should reject copyright claims
brought for the wrong reasons, it is quite likely that some copyright
claimants will try to hide their motives. They will sue for reasons of
censorship, but pretend that they want to protect incentives. Although
some pretexts will be easy to identify, courts following Judge McKeown’s
advice will eventually find cases where the reasons for the plaintiff’s suit
are unclear. How courts handle these ambiguous situations will greatly
affect how much the First Amendment restrains copyright claims of
doubtful value.
To get a sense of this, let us consider some law borrowed from another
First Amendment area involving motive—namely, the regulation of nonobscene adult entertainment. Because this speech is not obscene, it
receives full First Amendment protection.9 Nevertheless, local hostility to
5. See Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186 (1970); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 991 (1970).
6. See New Era Publications Intern., v. Carol Pub. Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990)
(copyright suit to enjoin publication of book portraying founder of Scientology in unflattering terms);
New Era Publications Intern., v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 579 (2d. Cir. 1989) (addressing a
copyright lawsuit against publishers of biography criticizing founder of Scientology).
7. See Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012) (addressing a
copyright lawsuitsuit against magazine that published photos of a secret celebrity wedding); Bond v.
Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003) (dealing with a copyright lawsuit to prevent use of plaintiff’s
unpublished book manuscript in a court proceeding because manuscript contained facts unfavorable to
plaintiff); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (bringing a copyright lawsuit
to enjoin publication of book about Salinger because book paraphrased Salinger’s unpublished letters).
8. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (actress bringing suit to remove
movie from YouTube because her role in movie exposed her to threats and ridicule).
9. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 251(2002) (holding First Amendment
protects speech that is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (“Nor may an entertainment program be prohibited solely because it
displays the nude human figure. ‘Nudity alone’ does not place otherwise protected material outside the
mantle of the First Amendment.”).
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adult entertainment sometimes encourages municipalities to ban or
otherwise limit adult entertainment in ways different from other
entertainment.10 Those who run adult businesses often challenge such
regulation on First Amendment grounds.11
Courts generally assess the constitutionality of laws regulating speech
by asking whether the law is content-based.12 According to the Supreme
Court, a law is content-based if it “applies to particular speech because of
the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”13 Courts apply strict
scrutiny to content-based regulation of speech, which generally leads to a
finding of unconstitutionality.14 By contrast, lower levels of scrutiny apply
to laws that are not content-based. Courts are more likely to find these
“content-neutral” regulations constitutional, because they only affect
speech incidentally.15 This distinction makes sense because content-based
regulations imply that the government has chosen to suppress one message
while favoring others.16

10. See Charles D. Perry, Since 2013, Horry County Spent More Than $200K Regulating Adult
Entertainment, MYRTLEBEACHONLINE, Jan. 30, 2016, http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/news/
local/article57380153.html; Janet Begley, Fellsmere Approves Ordinances Regulating Adult
Entertainment, TCPALM, Aug. 7, 2015, http://www.tcpalm.com/news/fellsmere-approves-ordinancesregulating-adult-entertainment-ep-1220195554-332115052.html; Waterford Ordinance to Regulate
Adult
Entertainment,
YOURERIE.COM
(last
updated
Nov.
5,
2014),
http://www.yourerie.com/news/news/waterford-ordinance-to-regulate-adult-entertainment.
11. See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2015) (suit contending that zoning
and licensing ordinances preventing operation of adult-entertainment clubs featuring semi-nude dancing
violated First Amendment); Entertainment Productions, Inc. v. Shelby County, 721 F.3d 729 (6th Cir.
2013) (suit arguing that local ordinance regulating adult-entertainment establishments violated the First
Amendment); Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, 630 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir.
2011) (action claiming that ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses violated First
Amendment); Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2014)
(plaintiff successfully claiming that city zoning bylaws violated First Amendment); Encore Videos, Inc.
v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2003) (suit claiming that ordinance regulating
adult-entertainment businesses violated First Amendment).
12. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The normal
inquiry that our doctrine dictates is, first, to determine whether a regulation is content based or content
neutral . . . .”).
13. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
14. See id. at 2227 (holding content-based laws must satisfy strict scrutiny); Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (“[I]t is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is contentbased”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid”).
15. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (content neutral laws
reviewed as time, place, and manner restrictions); Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (content-neutral regulation is constitutional if it
serves significant government interest and leaves open alternative channels for speech).
16. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (government “has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content”); Town of Gilbert,
135 S. Ct. at 2226–27 (government has no power to restrict speech based upon message conveyed).
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To see this, consider first a city ordinance prohibiting the display of
any sign tending to bring a foreign government into public disrepute. This
law singles out speech for suppression on the basis of its content, and it
strongly suggests that the ordinance exists to censor politically
controversial speech. Such behavior is surely odious to the First
Amendment.17
By contrast, consider next a law that prohibits “any congregation of
three or more persons within 500 feet of a foreign embassy.”18 This
ordinance might restrict speech activity (perhaps by preventing numerous
sign-holders from standing near a foreign embassy), but it is less likely to
violate the First Amendment because it does not discriminate against
speakers on the basis of their content.19 This suggests a benign motive for
the regulation, such as public safety,20 thereby weakening any First
Amendment challenge.
The foregoing implies that the First Amendment prohibits laws that
single out adult entertainment for unfavorable treatment, and indeed, many
cases reach this precise conclusion.21 However, some municipalities have
realized that they may be able to avoid First Amendment strict scrutiny by
claiming that they did not enact seemingly content-based ordinances for the
purpose of censoring adult entertainment. This involves the contention that
the government has moved to regulate secondary effects associated with
adult entertainment, and not the speech itself.22
In perhaps the most well known of these cases, the City of Renton
passed a zoning law that restricted adult businesses to certain highly

17. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (provision making it unlawful to display within
500 of a foreign embassy any sign tending to bring the foreign government into “public disrepute” is
content-based regulation violating the First Amendment).
18. Id. at 315.
19. Id. at 329–32 (provision making it unlawful “to congregate within 500 feet of any [embassy,
legation, or consulate] and refuse to disperse after having been ordered so to do by the police” is
constitutional).
20. Id. at 331.
21. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (holding that a municipality
may not prohibit nude dancing); Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61 (1st
Cir. 2014) (finding zoning bylaws regulating adult entertainment establishments unconstitutional);
R.V.S. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding ordinance requiring certain adult
entertainment establishments to obtain special use permits unconstitutional); Wil-Kar, Inc. v. Village of
Germantown, 153 F. Supp. 2d 982 (E.D. Wisc. 2001) (finding law requiring adult establishments to
obtain special license is content-based and unconstitutional); Clarkson v. Town of Florence, 198 F.
Supp. 2d 997 (E.D. Wisc. 2002) (holding prohibition against nude dancing unconstitutional);
22. See Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 71–73 (1976) (accepting argument that
zoning law imposing special rules on adult theaters attempted to preserve character of neighborhoods
and not censor speech); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (accepting
contention that zoning ordinance singling out adult businesses for less favorable treatment tried to
prevent crime, protect trade, maintain property values, and preserve the quality of neighborhoods).
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undesirable locations.23 This made it difficult to open a viable adult
business, and Playtime Theaters sued.24 On its face, Renton’s zoning
would appear to be content-based regulation. The law singled out a
specific form of entertainment for treatment less favorable than other nonadult businesses received.25 It is therefore easy to conclude that the law
was simply an effort to suppress adult speech—a classic form of
censorship.
The City of Renton responded to this problem by claiming that it did
not intend to suppress adult speech. The city claimed instead that it was
trying to prevent crime by regulating the placement of businesses that
contributed to these problems.26 This benign purpose allowed the Court to
review Renton’s law without using strict scrutiny, and this led to a finding
of constitutionality.27
For purposes of my essay, it is important to understand that the Court
could have rejected Renton’s argument as a red herring designed to
camouflage deliberate censorship. After all, it is difficult to imagine that
Renton did not know and approve of what its zoning would do to adult
businesses. Forcing Renton to justify these effects under strict scrutiny
would have sent an important signal to municipalities that attempts to hide
censorship would probably fail. The result would have been a relatively
strong barrier against deliberate suppression of speech.
By agreeing with Renton and holding the zoning constitutional, the
Supreme Court greatly weakened the ability of the content-based/contentneutral distinction to prevent purposeful censorship of speech. Now, any
time that the government engages in content-based regulation, it can
consider hiding that censorship underneath an argument that the true
purpose was to avoid some more generalized social ill. These arguments
may not always succeed, but to the extent they occasionally do, they
embolden those who would censor and make it harder for victims of
censorship to get relief.
I believe that courts trying to follow Judge McKeown’s advice will
encounter similar challenges in copyright. Indeed, it is pretty clear that
judges have already confronted cases involving disguised censorship, and
23. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 44 (1986).
24. Id. at 53 (noting plaintiffs’ contention there were no commercially viable sites for an adult
theater in Renton, although Supreme Court disagreed).
25. Id. at 44.
26. See id. at 48 (finding that city acted for purpose of preventing crime, protecting business, and
preserving property values).
27. Id. at 49–55 (reviewing ordinance as time, place, and manner restriction and finding
ordinance constitutional).
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they have sometimes failed to use the First Amendment the way Judge
McKeown suggests.
For example, in Salinger v. Random House, the defendant paraphrased
a number of J.D. Salinger’s unpublished letters as part of a biography about
the author.28 Salinger sued for copyright infringement, and the defendant
countered with a claim of fair use.29 Judge McKeown’s observations
strongly suggest that Salinger should have lost this case. He had no
intention of publishing his letters,30 so any connection to the preservation of
copyright incentives was weak. Additionally, Salinger was a well-known
recluse31 who took aggressive action to keep people from writing about
him.32 Despite this, Salinger prevailed.33 Moreover, in ruling against fair
use, the Second Circuit claimed that the preservation of copyright
incentives was an important reason for its decision.34
A prominent case like Salinger could considerably blunt the force of
Judge McKeown’s advice. To me, Salinger was the kind of plaintiff who
Judge McKeown thinks should fail. Accordingly, the Second Circuit’s
decision stands for the proposition that speculative claims about copyright
incentives should prevail, even when plaintiffs have pretty clear censorship
motivations. Granted, there are cases that stand for the opposite
proposition—namely, that copyright does not favor attempts to censor.35
Nevertheless, Salinger’s continued presence as “good law” emboldens
those who wish to censor by providing a legal roadmap for circumventing
First Amendment concerns about censorship.36

28. 811 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1987).
29. Id. at 94.
30. Id. at 99 (noting Salinger disavowed any intention of publishing the letters during his
lifetime).
31. See Vanishing Act: J.D. Salinger, TIME.COM, http://content.time.com/time/specials/
packages/article/0,28804,1902376_1902378,00.html (last visited February 7, 2016) (listing Salinger as
one of the top 10 most reclusive celebrities).
32. See W.W., Copywrongs: J.D. Salinger’s miserly legal legacy, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17,
2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/01/copywrongs (last visited February 7, 2016)
(describing Salinger’s “litigious streak” and lawsuits brought by Salinger).
33. 811 F.2d at 100 (finding Salinger was entitled to preliminary injunction).
34. Id. at 99 (identifying Salinger’s potential change of mind about publishing his letters in
measuring effect of defendant’s use on the market for Salinger’s letters).
35. See New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publ’g Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990)
(addressing copyright suit to enjoin publication of book portraying founder of Scientology in
unflattering terms); Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (refusing to dismiss
declaratory relief action against defendant accused of using threat of copyright action to censor book
about James Joyce).
36. For an example of Salinger’s influence, consider the case of New Era Publications,
International ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), in which the Second Circuit
found valid a copyright claim brought by a plaintiff against the author and publisher of an unflattering
biography. Although the force of this finding was largely blunted by the application of laches, the
apparent acceptance of using copyright for censorship remains.
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The foregoing shows that, for all its conceptual power, Judge
McKeown’s prescription will have, or could have, fairly minimal influence
over copyright law unless courts recognize that they must be skeptical
when plaintiffs claim not to have censorship motives. If they fail to apply
such skepticism and discredit precedent like Salinger, plaintiffs who want
to censor will sue for copyright infringement, because the possibility of a
Salinger-type result creates, at the very least, leverage for a censorshipfriendly settlement.
Personally, I think that such an outcome would be unfortunate.
Copyright already has frequently been extended at the expense of speech,
and I think that these extensions have brought relatively little incentive for
creation in return.37 Judge McKeown’s observations are important because
they hold the potential for limiting, or even reversing, such developments.
I hope that future courts heed her advice.

37. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243-266 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying
how copyright term extension creates effectively no incentive for creation of new works).

